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While Sanskrit was still in daily use for instruction, while Buddhist monasteries flourished in Eastern India, one Jayaraṣita compiled a commentary on a verse handbook on the discipline of novices, called *Śrīghanācāra (sic)-saṅgraha*. A famous novice-master (I suppose) called Śrīghana took himself as a model of conduct and deportment, and compiled a set of *kārikas* in a very precious Sanskrit. That was perhaps not less than a couple of centuries before Jayaraṣita, since by the latter's time the readings of the verses were doubtful in several places and there had been time for several widely known commentaries on them to circulate. Jayaraṣita mentions an 'idiot' as amongst his predecessors in this task (*kecit....mandadhiyaḥ* I. 14) and, with respect, *bhadanta* Parahita-ghoṣa (1.9) and *bhadanta* Prajūāsīmha (1.26). Those who are familiar with the names of Buddhist scholars in Northern India between the fourth (let us say) and eleventh centuries will be able to date this work vaguely by those indications. To date it would be really worth-while since the glimpses of social life which the work gives incidentally are quite intriguing.

The work is a work of casuistry, as indeed *vinaya* itself must be. Clearly distinguished from the Hindu *dharmaśāstra*, which flourished contemporaneously, the Sanskrit *vinaya* literature (of which so little remains) tackles casuistry in far greater detail and with far greater subtlety than the Hindu disciplinary sources. This may be because neither the criminal courts nor the penance committees or *gurus* required such guidance, or what guidance was available was sufficient without any attempt at 'codification'. My own acquaintance with Buddhism is of very recent growth. Readers of this article may well supply some clues which remain desiderata before a proper study of this present text can be put into printable form. In the meanwhile I have tackled in several places individual *śikṣāpadas*, in order to bring to a scattered readership something of the flavour of Buddhist casuistry in Sanskrit, many years later than the Pāli canonical texts which, perhaps in their Sanskrit counterparts, were deeply studied by the authors. Our text, under the name *Sphuṭārthā Śrīghanācāra-saṅgrahaṭīkā* was published by Sanghasena in 1968.<sup>1</sup> The reason why it and its contents are so poorly known is simple. For some reason, which we can only guess, the copyist was using a copy in which the actual verses of Śrīghana had been omitted, so that, with perhaps a couple of exceptions, every verse is missing. As I said, the style is precious and mannered, and required a linguistic

1. Patna, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1968 = Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, general editor S. H. Askari, vol. 11. The work was one of those found and photographed at Nagor monastery in Tibet by Mahapandit Rahula Sankrityayana. The edition by Sanghasena is much to be praised, but many questions are left to be answered.

commentary quite apart from an explanation of the sense in terms of ethics and conduct. But the effect of dropping out all the verses themselves, leaving these to be inferred from the numerous *pratīkas* or catch-words, is to make the commentary itself obscure and stylistically awkward. However, there is much we can understand, and the outlook, status and way of life of novices can be made out without difficulty.

It must be remembered that novices<sup>2</sup> took ten vows. They dressed somewhat similarly to monks, and lived with them on terms of intimacy: they were invited on alms-rounds as monks were, and they plainly were expected to perform services for the lay-followers similarly with the monks. No doubt the laity and strangers could distinguish novices from monks, but there was a tendency to treat them (rightly) as parts of a single body, and therefore the reputation of the monasteries had to be upheld as much by the novices as by the monks. A novice, though his novitiate might last a very long time (evidently), was anxious to be ordained as a monk. The monks had the responsibility of supervising his conduct, since upon ordination he would be expected to know the *prātimokṣa-sūtra* (*Pāṭimokkha*), and to live according to its principles. Unlike the monks, whose expulsion (if, unfortunately, required) must be the result of a legal act of the *saṅgha*, the novices were bound by the ten vows only, not the two hundred and twenty-seven rules found in the *Pāṭimokkha*. Yet, for breach of those they could be disciplined - but on a different footing. By the time we are speaking of the three categories of offences, namely the principal offence (divided into three principal and several minor categories beginning with *pārājika*, *saṅghādisesa*, etc.), 'grave offence' (*thullaccaya*), and *dukkata* (Skt. *duṣkṛtam*) had long been established. So far as monks were concerned the *thullaccaya*<sup>3</sup> and *dukkata* ('wrong-doing') were important, and monks must warn each other if there was an occurrence coming within them, but mere confession or admission of fault was sufficient to reestablish the offender's position. The conception of 'wrong-doing' and 'grave offence' is of unknown age, but there is no reason why it should be very much later in origin than the time of the Buddha. In the nature of things a clear-sighted director of conscience will wish his charges to know when they are *infringing* a negative injunction, coming within a little of breaking it. As the rabbis of the Jewish system recognise, it is important to plant a 'fence around the Law' so that actual breaches are made more difficult.

Where novices were concerned the terms *pārājika*, *saṅghādisesa*, etc., did not apply. There was no question of their having to make confession before the *saṅgha*, still less standing trial and being sentenced (if that is the appropriate word in this context) to *parivāsa* and *mānatta* (suspension followed by a sanitary convalescent period.) Unlike the monks, who have no force

2. On whom see the article 'Sāmaṇera or Sāmaṇuddesa' in the most useful work of C. S. Upasak, *Dictionary of early Buddhist monastic terms* (Varanasi, 1975), 231.

3. *Ibid.*, 110.

applied to them as a matter of punishment, the novices, if guilty of *dukkata* can well be admonished, and if repeatedly guilty can simply have their ordination postponed. There was however a real penalty, in that if guilty of breach of their vows they lost their status ipso facto as novices, as 'ascetics', and reverted, without trial or sentence, to lay status. Jayaraksita says bluntly (I, 11, 13) that they can be physically expelled by the servants of the monastery, thrown out. It was a matter of importance therefore to teach them what offences were merely *dukkata*, and which 'breach of vows' (*samvaratyāga*).

Srīghana saw no point, evidently, in following the order of the *Pāṭimokkha* of the Suttavibhaṅga (or their Sanskrit equivalents) in his teaching. It was anomalous to think of training novices in terms of the distinctions set out in the *Pāṭimokkha*, since what was required was that novices should get into good habits as a matter of principle, and not with reference to categories of offences from the point of view of monks' discipline. Therefore, what we have in this book is not a commentary on any monks' *vinaya* (incidentally, of course, nuns also existed and the principles applied *mutatis mutandis* to their novices also): it is based on the Suttavibhaṅga, with sundry omissions, and elaborations, which are alternative to, supplementary of, or refinements of, the canonical text. I have not attempted a comprehensive documentation of the sources Jayaraksita and his author were using. That can be left to experts in *vinaya*, and particularly in that of the Mahāsāṅghika school.

The first vow was 'not to slay a living being'. This incorporates several different rules from the point of view of monks' discipline. We shall come to them in turn. Casuistry requires definitions, and therefore contrasts and exceptions are of the essence. As a matter of fact any law-faculty would find the *pārājikas* as set out in the Suttavibhaṅga of the Pāli *vinaya-piṭaka* a good mental training. The difference between a 'wrong-doing' and 'defeat' is quite intelligible, and useful generalisations can be arrived at from the abundant illustrations. It is also extremely important to understand the difference between the objects and purposes of criminal law, with its own definitions of 'attempt', etc., and those of the Buddhist *saṅgha*, which is not indifferent to a deterrent effect, but which seeks to free the individual from return into the stream of re-birth. We may now go through the work and summarise the contents of this the first *śikṣāpada*.

I.1: One must not strike on any part of the body with any part of the body, or with an implement connected to the body. A 'living being' (*prāṇi*) is one in which the five limbs are developed, so an unformed embryo's destruction (though an offence for a monk) is not a cause of loss of status for a novice. However, *prāṇi* includes every creature through which men may pass in the cycle of metempsychosis. It is a *dukkata* to drink water containing living beings (a topic to which a very large area of this work is devoted, see below). A bodily 'proceeding' against man, woman, or eunuch is covered by the verse.

I.2: A verbal proceeding is also forbidden, e.g. praising death so that the person commits suicide. Here is the first of several examples of the progress from *dukkāṭa* to *saṃvara-tyāga*. If the novice says, 'You have made merit, going to the other world will be a voyage to paradise (*udyāna-yātrā*)', that is a *dukkāṭa*: if the man takes his life it is a loss of status as novice. So to cause a man to seek an executioner. This is familiar from the first *pārājika* in the Pāli canon.<sup>4</sup>

I.3: It is a *saṃvara-tyāga* to prepare a means whereby life is intended to be taken: purgatives, emetics, pigments, weapons such as an axe. Likewise abortion-causing drugs, etc. I.4: Not only may *means* of death not be furnished, but also auguries and omens of death may not be deliberately fabricated or disseminated. A verse is quoted about the virtue of correct conduct (*śīla*) which scholars in such literature may recognise and thereby improve our dating of this work: *daṭṭhāsīlyam śilaviratih prakṛtisāvadyāt prajñāpti-sāvadyāt bhagavatā pratiśiddhād vikāla-bhojanādeḥ dukkhatāpopa-kamanād apratisārādīnā prahlādītvena śītalatvācchilaṃ, 'sukhaṃ śīlasamādānaṃ kāyo na paritapyate.'*

I.5: The work passes to the question of killing by mistake, which is also familiar from the canon.<sup>5</sup> No loss of status results. If a second man, urged (it appears) by the first man, kills the wrong third man, it is not the offence of the first man. Our author remarks, following Śrīghana, that this (strange as it may seem to some) is the explicit teaching of the Buddha himself (as indeed it is). It is of the essence of the Buddhist view, unlike primitive and many traditional societies, that a person is bound only by intentional offences, though certain types of negligence are indeed offences in their own right. Our text does not discuss *accidental* slaying. I.6: The next question is the intentional preparation of concealed means of death such as nooses, pits and contrivances.<sup>6</sup> Sorceries with the aid of necromantic arts are included. One is liable for these contrivances if they cause loss of life. A verse from a *saṅgraha* (?) is quoted:

kūṭakam pāśam ity āhuḥ avamārthaṃ pāśa-yantrakam  
avapāyam avapātañ ca stambhākhyam yantram eva ca,

which suggests that an attempt to list methods of causing death of someone clandestinely could be sought in some reference-source.

I.7: The novice, intending a person's death must not send him where thieves operate<sup>7</sup> or he may encounter an army. I.8: Nor may he recommend dangerous fords over a river, or where there are snakes or a whirlpool (*āvartto*?), or

4. Cf. *Suttavibhaṅga* III. 2 = *Vinaya-pitaka* text III. 70 - 73.

5. *Ibid.* III. 4 = III. 74 - 75. There are subtleties: III.5.27 = III. 85.

6. Cf. *Ibid.* III. 4.1, 5 - 8.

7. Cf. *Ibid.* III. 5.26.

he has reason to expect these near a crossing. In a very interesting passage (1.9) he discusses the offence of sending a traveller along a path where the 'king' will cause him to be slaughtered, and the offence of saying to a person, specifically one under restraint for failure to pay tax or toll, 'Rather die than pay anything!' The objection is not to opposition to the state, which in any case would seem anomalous, but to intending death by means of persuasion of a second party. The fact that the latter retains some freedom of choice does not affect the liability of the persuader. Perhaps this is a case of 'undue influence'?

I.10: One must not recommend an unsafe rest-house or cell, where snakes are suspected, with the intention of causing death. Merely to point the way to such a place is a *dukkata*, if the man dies it becomes a *saṃvara-tyāga*. I. 11: One is liable, and forfeits one's status, if, belonging to the *śaṭha* caste (if that is the meaning *śaṭha-jātīya*?), one pretends to kill a tiger or some other animal and so kills one's enemy. One is to be thrown out of the *vihāra*.

I.12: One must avoid undharmic acts directed to the death of an enemy. One must remember (the story of ?) one Upamā and someone's death by means of a saw. The story of Upamā is unknown to me, but a specialist in *vinaya* may well pick up the allusion.

I.13: Next we come, very briefly, to killing by deputy<sup>8</sup>, and jointly with others. It is noticeable that the result is the same as with the *dharmasāstra's* notions about abettors and accomplices.<sup>9</sup> But the language and propositions are quite differently framed, and there can have been no cross-influence. Anyone who uses a novice to kill a third party is to be expelled. I.14: the ingredients of manslaying are five: *upakrama* (proceeding, commencement, attack), *niṣsaṃjñā* (knowledge of the identity of the person), *nara* (the person himself), *vadhaka-cetanā* (intention to slay, not merely to maim or wound), *jīvita-kṣaya* (the actual slaying). We should say that this adds up to murder. Without those ingredients the novice is not a *prāṇatīpātī* (murderer). I.15: the novice loses his status if he provides poison, weapons, etc., with a view to a killing. If that method is used. But if another method is used or another person actually kills him that second person's status is affected.<sup>10</sup> I.16: If a novice is hired to slay a third party<sup>11</sup> his position differs from that of an assassin who either knows no *vinaya* or has forgotten it. One who knows the risk certainly loses his status upon slaying the victim, but not a lunatic, who is not capable of misconduct, due to deficiency of memory.

8. *Ibid.* III. 4.2.

9. See *Manu-dharmasāstra* V. 51 and the commentary thereon of Medhātithi. 'Slayers' of an animal must be considered to include the one who permits it, the one who cuts it up, the actual slaughterer, the butcher, the cook, and the waiter as well as the eater. I shall not pretend that the outlook is distinct from the Buddhist, but the principle that an abettor is equal to a direct actor, which applies *a fortiori* in homicide, is not elaborated casuistically by Hindu lawyers.

10. So *Suttavibhaṅga* II. 4.2, cases 4, 6.

11. Cf. *Ibid.*, III. 1.1 = text III.68.

I.17: One must not cause harm or distress to creatures, imitating the Buddha who is compassion in body, speech, and mind. One must not hurt animals with a stick, rope, iron, or leather (thong), nor in fire or water. Nor feed them with poison etc. I.18. Ploughing (*karṣaṇam*) is forbidden because of the harms to earth-worms etc., and to the cattle that draw the plough (if I have understood the paragraph correctly). I.19: Branding and nose-piercing are forbidden, also beating with a stick.<sup>12</sup>

I.20: The next question is about meat killed for a novice to eat. One must not eat sauce made of a fish killed for one, since such food generates cruel intentions. If one eats it one causes the injury to the living creature. How does one find out whether meat has been killed for one (I.21)? 'By certainty, by inspection, by report, and by being suspicious'. One may trust the 'report' of a trustworthy person true to his word. Suspicion is aroused (I.22) when it is known that the household kept a bird, small cattle or pigs, and one sees a wing or a horn. Thereupon one can ask whether it has been killed for one's sake. Suspicion justifies asking the host. If the answer is affirmative one must eat nothing in that house. Naturally the prohibition applies only to one on whom this vow is incumbent. Of course the host may claim that the creature was killed by a hawk, and one can certainly eat what was prepared for a memorial feast for ancestors, or the flesh of what died through forced or wrong feeding! Food killed for one novice may certainly not be eaten by others (unexpected)! Even if the host designates it for monks, nuns, and male and female lay disciples (I.23).

We now come to an extremely long passage dealing with the intractable problem (which had the merit of great 'visibility' in sociological terms) of the drinking or other use of infested water.<sup>13</sup> I use the word 'infested' not in a hygienic sense, but simply as a convenient short-hand for the frequently repeated phrase *sajantukam jalam*, 'water having living creatures within it'. It is clear that the public did not relish the fastidiousness of the *saṅgha* so far as the water itself was concerned, but only in reference to the general scrupulosity of the *saṅgha* as a focus of *dharma*. Knowingly drinking water which is 'infested' is an offence. The creatures in question are not *fish*, since

12. Cf. *Pācittiya* 61 in the Pāli canon: *yo pana bhikkhu sañcicca pāṇam jīvitaṃ voropeyya pācittiyaṃ*.

13. Cf. *Pācittiya* 62 *ibid.*: *yo pana bhikkhu jānam sappāṇakam udakam paribhuñjeyya pācittiyaṃ*. I.B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline* III (Lodon, 1957), p. 3 n. 1, refers to *Samantapāsādikā* 865 for various uses of water, and Vin. II 118 and the introductory story to the 31st Jātaka for rules regarding filtering of water. The *Suttavibhaṅga*, *Pācittiya* LXII = text IV, 125 (trans. Horner, *ubi cit.*) is thin except for the casuistry: 'If he thinks that it contains living things when it contains living things and makes use of it, there is an offence of expiation. If he is in doubt as to whether it contains living things and makes use of it, there is an offence of wrong-doing (*dukkata*). If he thinks that it does not contain living things when it contains living things and makes use of it, there is no offence. If he thinks that it contains living things when it does not contain living things, there is an offence of wrong-doing. If he is in doubt as to whether it does not contain living things, there is an offence of wrong-doing. If he thinks that it does not contain living things, there is no offence.'

they are easily eliminated, or eliminate themselves from the predicament. Very small, almost invisible creatures are what is meant (I.24). It is admitted that there is a verse (where?) prohibiting the use of unclean water (not hygienically 'unclean', but in terms of infestation) for (i) irrigating trees, (ii) the teacher's bath! Yet the prohibition of drinking did not follow as a matter of course, and so it is laid down separately. Contrivances must be set up before water can be provided for drinking (I.25). A suitable cloth must be used in the vessel provided with a stopper. To avoid a *dukkāṭa* one must thus *filter in* the creatures (filtering them *out* would expose them to harm by another route!). Harm to such creatures is known to be forbidden.<sup>14</sup> The question of the eyesight necessary to participate in the straining out of the creatures smaller than gnats (cf. Matt. 23:24) is raised (I.26): people already suffering from long-sightedness are obviously excluded – one must be able to see the whorls of the 'finger-print' on the tip of one's thumb! (I.27). How long must one inspect the water? The point is relevant not only because haste suggests negligence of a rule, but because to take too long about it (in the interest of 'visibility', i.e. onlookers' admiration) savours of hypocrisy (I.28). The time required is that which a six-year-old elephant takes to turn round or a cart fully loaded with bamboo takes to turn round. Water must be taken from that level of the water (I.29) which is known to be free from creatures.

Where large creatures are (I.30) they can be chased away with the fingers: the water is not to be strained, not at any rate till they have gone down, or down-stream! What happens if some stick to the fingers? One must avoid the temptation to brush them off with hands, feet, or a handkerchief (I.30)!

A novice has been invited for a meal (I.31). He must ask 'Has this water been strained?' If not, an 'understanding' person, *not* an older person who does not know how to do it, is to be asked to strain it. It is a *dukkāṭa* to ask an incompetent person to strain water. In the absence of a competent person (I.32) he must use the straining vessel himself. What about the unfiltered water in his vessel? He must ask 'Whence was this water brought?' because there is the problem of returning the creatures to their habitat! He must release them whence they were brought. He must not release them into any (more) acid fluid! This does not apply to water that has already stood for seven days, which can be poured out on the spot, or poured in to a container in the monastery, where it will not evaporate. What about rain water? Clear quantities of water may be obtained (rarely) from rain. If living creatures are in it, he must pour it out with a *mantra* which, if it is read correctly, I can make little of, *nimnagānām patim mahāsamudrapūtaṅgacchatā* (?). Rain water was known to come from the ocean and it is reasonable that it should go back there, and presumably the creatures with which it is (supposed to be) infested are interested in returning thither.

14. At any rate depriving living creatures of life: so *Pācittiya*, 61.

In any case a Buddhist novice using a Hindu-style *mantra* is of interest. Usually water is obtained from a deep well. If infested, such water would be released using a large - mouthed vessel held by two ropes deep down in the well. (It would harm the creatures if they were poured out, flop!, at the top of the well!).

The problems of the traveller next arise, since his routine is different (I.33). He may drink from a well if he has investigated three pots full of its water. If all three pots are clear he can drink it. If no one of the three is, then the water is infested and he must filter it. The inspection must be drop by drop. Indeed this applies to river-water too, for the offence is to drink infested water *knowingly*. However he is not compelled to an impossibility. A verse is quoted which suggests that five or six pots should be examined before drinking:

*adhvaga-vyatirekena ghaṭikās tu ṣaṭ pañca vā  
pratyavekṣyopabhoktavyāḥ anyathā duṣkṛtī bhavet.*

But that applies to one *other* than a traveller, for whom three is enough.

Harm can be done (I.34) to creatures in water if ropes and pots are dropped into it (as we usually do). The next question is whether a novice may allow someone to drink infested water, or encourage one to do so; and whether, on the contrary, he must warn others from doing it. He must certainly not offer infested water. If asked whether the water is infested the *should not say whether it is or not* (since one cannot strain or inspect water by deputy!). He must not announce that water is infested in the presence of strangers.<sup>15</sup> If pressed by a direct question he may reply, '*kuru kāryam na veti samikṣya*', i.e. 'Perform the operation (of filtering) or not, after inspecting it'. One naturally wonders why he cannot announce the water to be infested, or imply that is his finding. Indeed he can do this if the questioner is his own *apādhyāya* or *ācārya*: those *can* be told the position plainly. In other cases the responsibility must be left with the questioner, and in any case the public are not to be encouraged to ridicule the monks' scrupulosity.

I.35: Infested water must not be used even where there is no question of internal use. Neither irrigation of plants nor baths for the teachers can be prepared with such water. Does the rule regarding water apply only to water in its natural state or to other fluids found in nature also (I.36)? Indeed it applies to all. If whey, sour gruel, yogurt, scum of boiled rice, such as can be churned with a stick, etc., become infested, the ascetic must not drink them, offer them to others, or *pour them on the ground*.<sup>16</sup> Why? Because the latter action would harm the 'creatures'!

15. In spite of *Pācittiya* 12: *aññavādake vihe ake pācittiyam*. Admittedly the *Suttavibhāṅga* confines this to cases where the offender is accused of an offence and is evasive.

16. So *Pācittiya*, 20.



I.37: We move next to care of bed bugs. Then as now people queried whether there was any obligation to be bitten by bugs. It is interesting to see that unlike ourselves who think of steeping the beds in paraffin, they used various methods found to be efficacious. But not so the poor novice. Bug-infested beds must not be dried in the sun, nor plunged in snow, mud, cold water or hot water! All forms oppressing creatures must be eschewed.

I.38: The monks' building operations would be a good field to test the qualities of the young novices. It is known from the time of the Buddha that the monks would get a bad name cutting down trees to make a *vihāra* or the like. Here the question is whether one can build using infested water. Yes, if the water is strained as far as possible. One uses a triangular funnel<sup>17</sup> for this at the end of the day and keeps it. It is a *dukkaṭa* not to release the strainer at the proper time and so set free the trapped creatures.

If straining is not done personally (I.39) a servant should be trained in the use of the funnel, strainer, and so forth. What is one to do if water is still infested, or becomes infested, even after straining? One passes it (I.40) through seven funnels, or a tube with seven cavities (it is not easy to visualise the exact method, there being no illustration and the terms being ambiguous). If even after this trouble the water is still infested one should give up the site and choose another. During building operations certain ephemeral bugs make themselves felt (I.41). One can carry on provided these bugs are born, die, and proceed to further births spontaneously. Nevertheless the usual caution must be observed. In I.42 we have an elaborate description of the lifting gear to be constructed to raise water from the river, etc., for building operations. A dense or fine filter is to be used on the mouth of the bucket which is lifted in such a manner as to cause least (or preferably, no) harm to the creatures in the water. The water obtained through the strainer at some depth is inspected after being lifted.

In the use of the strainer, funnel etc., a pierced wooden vessel with two ears is to be tied with a string.....such particulars are given to facilitate the purpose of this scrupulosity (I.43). Finally one who imitates Śrīghana will never discharge infested water which is sweet and drinkable (when strained) into acid water (I.44). This is an act devoid of compassion, and a *dukkaṭa*. But there is no offence if you discharge sweet water into acid water under the impression that the latter is sweet. The whole work is divided by the author (I.45) into the earlier part which deals with *dukkaṭas* which can ripen into loss of the status of novice, and mere *dukkaṭas*. He quotes a verse which he calls a *prahelikā* (riddle?):

*ṅkāyaṃ cetanopetam atrāste vadha-cetanaḥ  
ghātaka-vadha-vijñānaḥ katham nojjhati samvaraḥ ?*

17. Or container on a tripod? The technical terms still leave me in a quandary.

MANUSCRIPTS RELATING TO SRI LANKA (CONTINUED)

A modern reader will be astounded to see so much discussion of the sinfulness of discharging water containing infinitely small living creatures into other water with different chemical qualities, on the part of persons who are quite capable of recommending monks to sleep in snake-infested cells, to walk by a path beset by brigands, or to advise a recalcitrant taxpayer to withhold taxes at the risk of his life. Perhaps the right answer is one which is given nowadays by antivivisectionists: unless one takes seriously the sufferings of animals, etc., one cannot claim to be humane in one's dealings with fellow human beings, and insensitivity to the pain of lesser beings leads eventually to insensitivity to the pain of one's fellow humans. That may not have been the exact motive behind the Buddhist scrupulosity (which was a typically Indian phenomenon) but the rationalization is probably not far wide of the mark.

(i) In the 102 of entries I the several important documents of Sri Lanka... (i) In the 102 of entries I the several important documents of Sri Lanka... (i) In the 102 of entries I the several important documents of Sri Lanka...

(ii) Two copies of a memorandum by the late General D. G. de Silva... (ii) Two copies of a memorandum by the late General D. G. de Silva... (ii) Two copies of a memorandum by the late General D. G. de Silva...

(iii) Discussion of the 'Consejo de Fomento' on the sale of... (iii) Discussion of the 'Consejo de Fomento' on the sale of... (iii) Discussion of the 'Consejo de Fomento' on the sale of...

(iv) Two copies of a memorandum by the late General D. G. de Silva... (iv) Two copies of a memorandum by the late General D. G. de Silva... (iv) Two copies of a memorandum by the late General D. G. de Silva...

(v) Discussion of two persons on (a) and (b)...

(vi) Discussion of two persons on (a) and (b)...

(vii) Discussion of two persons on (a) and (b)...

(viii) Discussion of two persons on (a) and (b)...