

## Nagarjuna's Interpretation of Súnyatâ

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Suñña(suññatâ) is concept known to and used by the Buddha himself to present his world-view, to explain the true nature of things. However, there is no doubt that it is Acarya Nàgàrjuna that really popularized this concept, and presented this as the central teaching of the Buddha. Àcàrya Nàgàrjuna in his *Mulamadhyamaka* kârikâ elaborately lays down the fundamental principles of his interpretations of the Buddha 's teaching.

This he called the Madhyamaka philosophy.

It is very well known that the Buddha avoided resorting to any form of extremism. His first discourse, the "Dhammacakkhappavattana Sutta" delivered to the group of five (pancavaggiya), begins with an admonition to avoid the two extremes religious practices that were widely prevalent at that time. One is self-mortification(attakilamathânuyoga) and the other is self-indulgence (In sensual pleasures- kâmasukhallikânuyoga). Rejecting these he presents a novel religious practice which the Buddha himself call this Middle Practice (majjhimâ patipadâ).

Any religious practice is turned on a philosophy a world view it upholds. Once again it is seen that there were two main philosophies widely in vogue at that time. These were eternalism (sassatavâda) and annihilationism (uccedavâda), both accepting some kind of an entity, a self/soul (atta/atman) ; the eternalist believed in a permanent everlasting metaphysical entity. While the annihilationists accepted an impermanent, physical entity , that get destroyed at the death of a person .

The Buddha labels these two philosophies also as being extreme ones ,and presents a middle philosophy which denies an entity, a self , whatever, permanent or not and upholds a novel view which explains everything as being independently as being arising (paticcasamuppanna) rising (uppâda) and falling (vaya) and always in a flux.

Ignorance of this true nature of things that is everything is dependently arising, and therefore, subject to rise and fall, and hence without any permanent substance is considered in early Buddhism the cause of all dukkha. This ignorance defiles the mind . The mind is in bondage to continuous existence (samsara). This mind lies to be cleansed of all defilements in order to attain freedom from recurring births. This cleansing is done by gradual process of moral cultivating , mind development leading to the development of wisdom through which one could see and know the true nature of things; get rid of ignorance, cleanse the mind and attain emancipation.

In this process though morality, cleansing of the mind, and development of wisdom are equally emphasized , Buddhism being a religion that gives more importance to psychology, cleaning

of the mind appears to be more emphasized. This is seen by the importance attached to asâvakkhaya-ñâna- knowledge regarding the destruction of defilements.

In early Buddhist practice "knowing and seeing" of the true nature of things is considered as a personal experience, obtained through one's own superior knowledge (abhiññâ). Later when different schools developed the emphasis was more on the use of logic and reasoning to understand the true nature of things. Therefore, schools like Sarvâstivâda came up with different interpretations regarding the nature of reality. This led to concepts like svabhâvâ (self-nature). These metaphysical concepts were the results of attempts to explain anicca and anatta doctrines logically, using reason as evidences.

It is to counter-act these that Madhyamaka school attempted to counter-argue and show that schools such as Sautrântika, Sarvâstivâda, and such like misrepresented the early teaching of anicca and anatta of the Buddha. But unlike the Buddha, Nâgârjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka, also used logic and reasoning. He through his method of argument called 'apohavada'- which shows the internal constructions of the thesis other schools- rejects them as self-contradictory and, therefore, ill-logical.

Buddhism, whereas, as shown in previous chapters, attempted to induce the practitioners to "see and know" the true nature of things through personal experience (for example; by such meditative practices of cultivation of Samâdhi such as the practice of training the mind to see everything as empty. See the chapter on "Cûla suññata" and "Mahâsuññata Suttas", Nâgârjuna used his dia-

lects to give an intellectual understanding of the. Though the objectives of Early Buddhism and Madhyamaka is the same, the method adopted in realizing the objective is quite different. The openly says that the final realization of the truth is beyond logic and reasoning (atakkâvaca), Nâgârjuna makes logic and reasoning the predominant means of understanding this truth. The difference is only in the method; the outcome or the objective intended is the same. Like Early Buddhism, Madhyamaka aims at inducing its followers to view everything as dependently arising and therefore, subject to rise and fall. What is subject to rise and fall is impermanent (anitya/anicca). What is impermanence is void (šûnya) or in the more popular early Buddhist terminology, it is void of a soul, anything connected with a soul (suñño attena vâ attaniyena vâ). This is exactly what Âcârya Nâgârjuna is trying to remind the Buddhists. As asown before, some Buddhist teachers deviated from this early teaching, and while accepting the voidness of individual of a soul (anatta), in a unwitting manner posited the belief that the constituent elements (dharma/dhamma) are absolute (parâmartha/paramattha), and as having at least partial permanency.

These later teachers appear to have overlooked the fact that when the Buddha said that "**sabbe dhammâ anatta**", this included everything, even asankhata (unconditioned) things. Thus, it is very clear that the Buddha spoke about the explaining voidness of even elements. By trying to explaining impermanency or 'change' (aniccatâ) according to reason and logic the later teachers triugh in concepts that not in agreement with the teachings of Early Buddhism. Âcârya Nâgârjuna who was extremely versed

with Early Buddhist teachings had to forcefully remind these late schools of Buddhist thought that they are misrepresenting the Buddha's teaching.

In order to do this he emphasized that the individual is void of a soul (pudgala-nâiratmya). But, he has another problem to overcome. This is to emphasize that not the individual but even the factors that constitute the individual and the world itself, that is all elements (dharmâs) are void of anything permanent. For this he emphasized 'dharma-nairâtmya,' which was not given special emphasis in Early Buddhism, for there was no belief at that time regarding the permanency of elements.

In order to cover both these aspects, that is the voidness concerning the individual and the elements, Ācārya Nagarjuna very correctly opted to use the term śūnya unlike anatta which mainly conveyed the idea of absence of an individual soul, the term śūnya denoted a wider meaning bringing out the absence of any entity in anything whether in the individual or in the constituent the elements.

Ācārya Nāgārjuna used the Buddha's central teaching about the dependent origination (paticcasamuppāda) nature of everything established the voidness of all phenomena. In Early Buddhism paticcasamuppāda doctrine is used more to emphasize the interdependence of all phenomena. Ācārya Nāgārjuna, very correctly, saw that the Buddha's real purpose of explaining everything as being subject to paticcasamuppāda is to show the voidness of everything of any permanent substance. Therefore, he emphasized the "reality" aspect of it. If everything exist in relation to other things, then there is no independent existence of

anything; extreme or non-extreme itself is relative. Thus, the two approaches only difference of emphasis, though in meaning and spirit they are same. Ācārya Nāgārjuna very rightly applies śūnya to both whatever that is compounded, hence his conclusion regarding Samsāra and Nirvāna.

He says; "**na samsārasya nirvanāti kiñcid asti viśesanam -na nirvānasya samsārāt kiñcid asti viśesanam.**" (1) This has been generally translated to mean that there is no distinction between Samsāra and Nirvāna, and both samsāra and nirvāna are similar. It is very doubtful whether Ācārya Nāgārjuna intends making such a statement. If so, he is suggesting that there is no need for people to strive to attain emancipation. If this is taken in the above sense then the whole of Buddhist practice becomes no value. It is accepted that samsāra is dukkha, and to escape this dukkha realization of Nirvana is necessary. Then, it is obvious that these two cannot be identical.

Ācārya Nāgārjuna is saying something more profound. Even according to Early Buddhism that everything, the whole world should be viewed as *suñña* (*suññatao lokam avekkhassu*). Similarly, nibbana is also defined in Early Buddhism as *suñña*, void of anything substantial; the realization of voidness of everything is the realization of Nibbāna. In this respect, that is the absence of substance or an entity samsara and nirvāna are same; they are without "**something**" (*kiñcid*) that make them distinct from each other.

The used of the word 'kiñcid' is very significant. What Ācārya Nāgārjuna says is that there is no "something" that make them different from each other immediately following stanza further

establishes this' (2) **“Nirvânasya ca yâ koti kotih samsaranasya ca - na tayor antaram kiñcid suksmam api vidyate”** (whatever, is the end of nirvâna and the end of the circling of life process, between them there is not even a very subtle thing that is to be seen).

It is important to observe that Ācārya Nāgārjuna is saying that there is no even a **“subtle something”** (kiñcid sūksmam api) between samsāra and nirvâna (tayor antaram). In the absence of that is in being void of such **“something”** both are comparable. But, this does not mean that samsara and Nirvâna are identical in all respect. What is Ācārya Nāgārjuna trying to emphasize is that Nirvâna is also sūnya, a teaching very explicitly expressed in early Buddhism. But, this teaching of Nagarjuna seem to have been misunderstood during his own time. There is evidence in the *Mūlamadhyamaka kārīka* itself that suggests such misunderstandings consider, for example; why Ācārya Nāgārjuna had to say: **“emptiness, however, is not annihilationism; and samsāric existence is not eternal”** (sūnyatā ca nacochedah samsārasca na sāvratam) (3)

Further consider the saying : **“For him who is engrossed in existence, eternalism or annihilationism will necessarily follow, for he would assume that it is either permanent or impermanent”** (4) It is because śūnyatā doctrine was wrongly grasped that Ācārya Nāgārjuna was forced to adopt a simile found in the "Alagaddūpamasuttā" of Majjhimanikāya (5). And warn people not to wrongly grasped this teaching. Ācārya Nagarjuna in a firm admonition says: **“A wrongly perceived emptiness ruins a person of little intelligence. It is like a snake that is wrongly grasped or knowledge that is wrongly cultivated”**(6)

All these clearly suggest that śūnyatā was misunderstood from very early times. On the one hand, it was thought to be the total emptiness, absence of anything, an utter form of nihilism. It was taken to such extremes that Ācārya Nāgārjuna's śūnyatā doctrine was interpreted as a denial of all fundamental teachings of the Buddha. Thus, for example, Ācārya Nāgārjuna analysis of action and agent (chapter 08. karma-karaka-pariksa) has been interpreted as a total denial of karma by him. A similar interpretation is given to the "karmaphala pariksā" (chapt.17). In the "tathagatha-pariksā" (chapt.22) that is examination of tathagata presents statements as follows: **“The Tāthagata is neither the aggregates nor different from them. The aggregates are not in him, nor he in the aggregates. He is not possessed of the aggregates. In such a contexts who is a Tāthagata”(7)** .”He who is dependent upon other nature would appropriately to without self. Yet how can he who is without self be a tathagata?”.(8)

Such statements have been taken to mean that the Tathāgata does not exist. But Ācārya Nāgārjuna's objective was quite different, and philosophically more deep. He did not deny the attribution of permanency, a self-nature to these. But, many failed to grasp this deep philosophical significance, and labeled śūnyatā doctrine as a form nihilism which posited a total valid, absence of anything'. Thus, sunyata was taken in its most primary sense, and Madhyamaka doctrine of śūnyatā was misinterpreted.

On the other hand this śūnyatā was raised to aganst of the Absolute Truth, the Ideal, giving it the status of something that eternally exist. Perhaps, this may have been due to the influences of the Brahman concept in Vedanta Philosophy. Thus same schol-

ars define śūnyatā presented by Ācārya Nāgārjuna as ‘ the unconditioned which is the ultimate truth of the conditioned’, such definitions raise śūnyatā into a metaphysical concept. There is no metaphysics in this way Ācārya Nāgārjuna describes śūnyatā. For him as it was for the Buddha himself, śūnyatā meant the total absence of any entity, any substance, whatever name we use to identify it.

Just as the Buddha admonished his followers not to raise “anatta’ doctrine to the status of a view and start blindly clinging to it, Ācārya Nāgārjuna, is a very tersely worded admonition, tells the followers the same thing. he says; **“The victorious ones (Jinas) have declared that emptiness means the giving up of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are to be incorrigible”**(9)

Thus, just as the Buddha did not intend to present anatta (anātma) as a view or a theory opposed to “atta” (ātma) view , Ācārya Nāgārjuna , too, is emphatically saying that sunyata should not be considered as a view (drsti). Dogmatic clinging to views is denounced by both the Buddha and Ācārya Nāgārjuna. Both advocate the giving up or relinquishing of all views (sarvadrsti prahana). In fact Ācārya Nagarjuna explicitly says that this is the Buddha ‘s teaching. He in his concluding verse of salutation to the Buddha says; **“I reverently bow down to Gotama who, full of compassion, has taught the true doctrine in order to relinquish all views”**(10). Thus, both anatta (=śūnyatā) of early Buddhism and śūnyatā of madhyamaka are not ideals, nor are they theories or views. If so what are they?. Both are philosophical and meditational means of realizing emancipations or Nibbāna (nirvāna). It was earlier pointed out that we all are in bondage to

samsaric existence because of our ignorance. This ignorance is our inability, so see things, all phenomena as they have come to be (yathābhūta). Since, our vision is blurred by ignorance, we construct everything through our ignorance , our idea about the world, in brief our whole world-view is a lopsided one . Suñña or śūnya is a means to drive away ignorance , to obtain a true vision of all phenomena, to turn right side up of things which we view with upside down the Buddha ‘s teaching is for this. In many suttas, listeners after hearing the Dhamma and obtaining “eye of Dhamma” (dhamma-cakkhu) declares in the following manner how their vision has got straightened and clear.

**“Excellent ,sir, excellent. It is as if someone were to set up what has been turned upside down uncovered what has been covered, or pointed out the way to one who has lost his way, or to hold an oil-lamp in the darkness, so that those with eyes may see visual objects.... Just so, the Fortunate one has expounded the Dhamma in numerous ways...”**(11)

This sort of expressions of confidence and appreciation are very common in the Nikāyas. What this clearly shows is that Dhamma is what helps one to uncover what has been hidden by ignorance what is this Dhamma. This is the explanation of the true nature of things. As explained in the "Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta" of the *Majjhimanikāya*, This Dhamma is paticca samuppāda (dependent origination ) In this sutta the Buddha very explicitly says; **“ He who sees paticcasamuppāda sees the Dhamma; he who sees the Dhamma sees paticcasamuppada ( yo paticcasamuppadam passati so dhammam passati; yo dhammam passati so paticcasamuppādam passati)”**.

This paticcasamuppâda , as it has already been shown clearly, is nothing other than the relativity, interdependence, absence of permanency, absence of any independence existence in phenomena. As shown before, the Buddha very clearly brings out this in the "Kaccâyanagottasuttâ" of the *Majjhimanikâya*. This sutta brings out the fact that paticcasamuppada shows that all phenomena is void of a soul or any such entity that could be considered as the soul. Therefore, paticcasamuppâda according to the Buddha is another way of expressing the emptiness of all phenomena. This teaching of the Buddha is very emphatically highlighted by Ācārya Nāgārjuna . He equates paticcasamuppada with sunya. He says: **"Whatever that is dependent arising we say that is emptiness"** (12). To Ācārya Nāgārjuna pratityasamuppada and śūnyatā are co-terminus; They cover the same meaning and refer to the same thing. Thus identification of pratityasamuppâda with śūnyatā very well establish the fact that unlike many other teachers , who attempted to interpret Buddhism by bringing in metaphysical concepts such as 'svabhava' (self-nature) own nature, Ācārya Nāgārjuna had very correctly grasped the essence of the Buddha's teaching , that everything is suñña (śūnyatā).

The Buddha was very careful to caution his followers that none of his teachings should be considered as views (ditthi/drsti) and tenaciously cling to them. He, on the other hand advocated the giving up of all views. Even Dhamma should not be taken as the gospel truth, a dogmatic views to which followers should pay homage and reverence. In the "Alagaddupamasutta" of the *Majjhimanikâya*. The Buddha compares the Dhamma to a raft. A raft has to be used to cross the water. The Buddha says that once it

has been used it should not be grasped and carried on the head or the shoulders, for this means the attribution of some entity, some substance to Dhamma and raising it to an idealist state. It is not to be clutched the sake of crossing (nittaranatthâya), like a raft (kullupamam).

Besides, the Buddha rejecting that this paticcasamuppada is a theory, says that even the Dhamma has to be given up. This is exactly what Ācārya Nāgārjuna says about śūnyatā. Though there has been an attempt to raise śūnyatā into Absolute Reality, which will ever remains as a supra-mundane reality, Ācārya Nāgārjuna, rejects such attempts. Just as the Buddha did not advise his followers to discard the soul-view and substitute it with the no-soul (anatta) view , Ācārya Nāgārjuna also strongly warns against those who attempt to discard all other views and adopt śūnyatā as the absolute supra-mundane reality.

Just as the Buddha used "Anatta" as a means of freeing the mind of the deep-rooted belief in a self, a metaphysical self as well as psychological attachment to a permanent entity, Ācārya Nāgārjuna uses śūnyatā as a means of dispelling all false views and seeing the true nature of everything. This does not make śūnyatā a super-view that conveys all other views. It is like a fire brand , a torch that lightens up a dark place and make visible the objects in the place, the objects that one has been searching for. Once the objects are truly seen and found , the use of the fire brand or the torch is over. So is śūnyatā. It enlightens one, it helps to straighten the vision, to dispel ignorance , to destroy all subjective tendencies that distort proper understanding.

Ācārya Nāgārjuna clearly says that the Buddha himself has declared that emptiness or śūnyatā is giving up (nishsaranam) of all views. He further says that to whom śūnyatā is a view, they are incorrigible.(13).

It has been shown earlier that anatta, śūnyatā and pratitya-samutpada means the same. In meaning and sense they are one; the difference is only in terminology. To see anything as Anatta, means to see that as śūnyā and paticcasamuppāna. They are all paticca-samuppāna. This is why, following the Buddha (suñño lokam avekhassu: see the world as empty), Ācārya Nāgārjuna advises his followers to see everything as śūnya. He says, it is those who see dependent origination sees also suffering, its arising, its ceasing and the path leading to its cessation.(14).

This is the true purpose of śūnya, or as a matter of fact of śūnya, Anatta, and paticcasamuppāda. They are referred to as Dhamma (Dharma), because it is Dhamma that shows the way to emancipation, the way to dispel ignorance and attain enlightenment. It is like the finger that points to the moon, the thing that is to be perceived. One showed to be the moon, know should one think that the moon is there dependent on the finger.

Similarly, śūnyatā like Anatta, and paticcasamuppāda is only a means to see things in their true nature. This means that is śūnya, should not be considered as the end. In the case of śūnya this seems to have happened. Some consider sunya to be the ultimate reality that finally exist when every other theory has been demolished. This is not so. It is to dispel this wrong understanding that Ācārya Nāgārjuna says that śūnya itself is śūnya, that is śūnya itself is without any substance. Like everything else śūnyatā

itself is sunya. So there is nothing to grasp in śūnyatā. Neither posses a self, a "svabhava" (self-nature) or anything related to self or self-nature. Therefore, śūnyatā, should not be raised to an idealistic state. If that happens, the whole purpose for which śūnyatā is meant would get lost.

Śūnyatā should be used as a means to demolish all views, connected with a self. By giving up all other views and holding on to śūnyatā. Correct view or the perfect view is not another view to which we should tie ourselves. Śūnyatā is in other words", prajñā regarding the true nature of things, how things have come to be. This is not a view but a correct understanding of the true nature of all things. When one sees the true state of things being void dukkha or suffering, we have been understand due to ignorance regarding the true nature of will get dispelled.

It is seen that Ācārya Nāgārjuna in his *Mūlamadhyamaka* kārīka is adopting a system of logic to prove that everything is śūnya. For this purpose he analyses the views put forward by all other schools regarding the nature of reality and highlights their internal contradictions. By demonstrating these internal contradictions, he reduces those views to mere absurdities and, for this reason, his method of argument is called **reduction ad absurdum**. Predominantly through logic and reasoning that Ācārya Nāgārjuna is trying to bring into forefront the original teaching of the Buddha.

This, perhaps, may be due to the circumstances in which he was writing and teaching. By that there were schools like the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika that were profusely engaged in using logic and reasoning to prove their view points. The arguments

of the master of these schools of Buddhist thought had to be logic and reasoning. The result was the *Mulamadhyamika* kârîka.

On the whole the Buddha's approach was different. While the Buddha used logic and reasoning to establish the fundamentals of his teachings, he did not stop at that. He urged his followers to obtain personal experience of these fundamentals. For example, he used logic and reason to convince his listeners that there is no self or any pertaining to a self underlying phenomena. While logic and reasoning was made use to instill this conviction, the Buddha urged his followers to engage in meditation to gain personal experience of that conviction.

Samâdhis such as animitta, appanihita, are for this purpose. The "Cûla-suññata sutta" and "Mahâ-suññata sutta" (both of which have already been discussed in details) clearly shows speak of meditational practices that lead to the personal experiencing of this conviction which one obtains through logic and reasoning. This does not mean that Ācârya Nâgârjuna did not advocate the practices of meditation. But it is clear that greater emphasis in the *Madhyamakâ* kârîka is on an intellectual understanding of śūnyâ as the true nature things. The more one uses words to the more one provides opportunities to misinterpret. This seems to have happened in the case of sunyata as presented by Ācârya Nâgârjuna. His predominant use of logic had led his readers to grasp sunyata intellectually and not experientially. Intellectual grasping is very often coloured by one's prejudices, one's preconceived notions, his likes and dislikes. Intellectual grasping tends to be rather subjective.

The process indicated in the Suttas the process of different meditations recommended for this purpose, enables one to personally experience the voidness, emptiness of all things. It makes one give up all views; prevents one from mistaking śūnyatâ to be a view. It turns into one's own understanding about the true nature of oneself and his world of existence. Therefore, the intellectual understanding one obtains through the presentation of śūnyatâ doctrine in the *Mulamadhyamika* kârîka should be further verified, clarified through existence.

This is the message Ācârya Nâgârjuna offers through his writings. The listeners are thoroughly advised not to be content by taking śūnyatâ to be a mere theory or, view. It should be utilized as a means to purge out all views from the mind. It is the only way to dispel confusion and ignorance hinders proper understanding of the true nature of phenomena. When one internalizes this experience of śūnyatâ then he will realize 'that there is nothing that is not dependently arisen', and therefore, a thing that is non-empty is not indeed evident (15).



**End notes**

- (1) Múlamadhyamakakârikâ, chapter 25.stanza 19.
- (2) Múlamadhyamakakârikâ, chapter 25.stanza 20.
- (3) Múlamadhyamakakârikâ, chapter17: stanza20.
- (4) Múlamadhyamakakârikâ, chapter 20: stanza 14.  
**“Bhavam abhyyupapannasya sâvatoccheda-  
darśanam prasajyate sa bhâvohi nitya'nitya  
thava bhavet”.**
- (5) Majjhimanikâya, "Alagaddúpamasutta".
- (6) Múlamadhyamakâkarika, chapter 24: stanza 11  
**“vinaśyati durdratâ sūnyatâ  
mandamedhasam sarpo yathâ durgrhito  
vidyâ va dusprasadhî”**
- (7) Mulamadhyamakakrika chapter 22 stanza 01  
**“ skandha na nanyah akandhebhya nasmin  
skandha na tesusah tathâgatah skandhavan  
na katamo'tra tathagatah”**
- (8) Mulamadhyamakakrika chapter 22 stanza 03  
**“pratitya parabhavan yah so'natmety  
upapadyate yas'canatma sa ca katham bhavisyati  
tathagatah**
- (9) Múlamadhyamakârika chapter 14, stanza 08.  
**“ sunyata sarva-drstinâm proktâ nihsaranam  
jinaih yesam tu śūnyatâ-drstis tan asadhyan  
babhasire”**
- (10) Múlamadhyamakârika, chapter 27; stanza 30  
**“ sarva-drsti-prahânyâ yah saddharmam adesayat  
anukampam upâdâya tam namasyami gautamam”**

- (11) Dighanikâya, "Ambhattasutta"

**“Abhikkantam bho Gotama, abhikkantam  
bho Gotama, seyata pi bho**

**Gotama nikkujjitam va ukkujjeya, paticchannam va  
vivareyya, mulhassa va maggam acikkheyya,  
andhakare va telapajjotam dhareyya cakkhumante  
rupam dakkhinti ti . Evameva bho Gotamena,  
anekapariyayena dhamm pakasito”.**

- (12) Múlamadhyamakârikâ, chapter 24.stanza 18

**“yah pratityasamupadah sunyam tam pracaksuhe”**

- 13) Múlamadhyamakârikâ, chapter 13: stanza 08.

**“sunyata sarva-drstinam prokta nihsaranam jinaih  
yesam tu sunyate drstis tan asadhyan babhasire”.**

- (14) Múlamadhyamakârikâ, “chapter 24. stanza40.

**“ yah pratitya samutpadam pasyatam pasyati  
dukkham samudayam caiva nirodham margam eva ca  
“**

- (15) Mulamadhyamakârikâ, chapter 24; stanza 19.

**“apratitya samutpanno dharmah kascin na vidyate  
yasmad Tasmad asunyo hi dharmah kascin na vidyate”**